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Introduction
Tax di¤erentials are one potential determinant of shopping decisions. In particular, crossborder shopping or buying online may allow consumers to bene…t from lower tax rates in other jurisdictions. For tax revenue maximizing governments, attracting mobile consumers, crossborder or online shoppers, may also be a goal in tax policy and thus drive tax competition among governments.
Department of Economics, University of Göttingen, Platz der Göttinger Sieben 3, 37073 Göttingen, Germany, laura.birg@wiwi.uni-goettingen.de. 1 68 % of consumers in Luxembourg have purchased goods or service in other member states. In contrast, in countries at the European periphery the prevalence of cross-border shopping is much lower, e.g., 10 % of consumers in Greece and 9 % of consumers in Portugal and Bulgaria have purchased goods abroad (Eurostat, 2009) . 2 Consumers show a substantial degree of home bias for online shopping: In 2014, 44% of consumers purchased online nationally, only 15% bought from an online retailer from another EU country (European Commission, 2015). Cowgill, Dorobantu & Martens (2013) estimate from Google e-commerce data that over the period [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] , online consumers in the EU were up to 55 times more likely to buy in their own country than in another EU country. Consumers from smaller countries are more likely to purchase from retailers from other member states, e.g., 42% of consumers in Malta have purchased from an online retailer from another country vs. 11% who purchased from a domestic online seller (Flash Eurobarometer 358, 2012).
bene…t from tax di¤erentials. The e¤ect of the tax treatment of online purchases on consumers'
shopping decisions, in turn, drives governments' incentives to engage in tax competition for mobile consumers. If tax treatment of online purchases according to the destination principle does not expose consumers buying online to tax di¤erentials, the potential to compete for mobile consumers is lower; if tax treatment of online purchases according to the origin principle exposes consumers to tax di¤erentials, the potential to compete for mobile consumers is higher. 3 In the USA, most states levy sales taxes, but there is no uniform sales tax on the federal level. Cross-border shopping is tax treated according to the origin principle. Before 2018, states usually were only able to collect sales taxes from online stores in other US states, if they had a "nexus" to the respective state. Typically this required the online retailer to have a (permanent or temporary) physical presence in the state. If an online store did not have a nexus to the state, the tax authorities depended on tax declaration by users for tax collection (use tax) (Hu & Tang, 2014) . In June 2018, the Supreme Court of the United States has decided that states may charge sales taxes based on remote purchases made by sellers from another state which have no physical presence in the state where the customer resides (South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc.). After the Supreme Court's decision, most federal states that levy a sales tax have started to introduce laws requiring online sellers to collect sales taxes, even if they have no physical presence in the state. This requirement is -following the Supreme Court's decision -usually conditional on the online seller making a minimum revenue of USD 100,000 in the respective sate or having at least 200 transactions per year in the respective state (Prete, 2018; Rosenberg, 2018) . De facto, this corresponds to the destination principle being applied for online sales subject to a de minimis clause.
Previous literature on tax competition and cross-border shopping has emphasized the importance of di¤erences between countries (see e.g., Kanbur & Keen, 1993; Nielsen, 2001) , typically …nding that the smaller country undercuts the tax rate of the larger country. In their seminal paper, Kanbur & Keen (1993) study revenue-maximizing governments in an open economy with two countries di¤ering in population size. In the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium, the tax rate of the smaller country is lower than the tax rate in the larger country. Subsequent studies have also focused on di¤erences between countries, in population size (Trandel 1994; Wang 1999) or geographical size (Ohsawa 1999; Nielsen 2001 Nielsen , 2002 . 4 Several empirical studies have stressed the e¤ect of taxes on shopping decisions. Goolsbee (2000) …nds that consumers in high sales tax locations are more likely to buy online. A 1%-increase in the sales tax increases the probability of buying online by 0.5%. Ballard and Lee (2007) show that consumers shop online to avoid sales taxes. They also …nd that consumers who live close to counties with lower sales tax rates are less likely to shop online. Leal, Lopez-Laborda & Rodrigo (2010) interpret these …ndings as cross-border shopping and Internet shopping being substitutes. Using eBay data, Einav et al. (2014) estimate the impact of sales taxes on online shopping. They …nd that a one percentage point increase in a state's sales tax increases online purchases by state residents by approximately 2 percent, but decreases their online purchases from home-state retailers by 3-4 percent. Using data from a retailer that sells through the Internet and catalogs, Hu & Tang (2014) study the e¤ect of sales tax changes, …nding that a tax cut by 4 percentage points has decreased remote sales by about 15%. Agrawal (2017) shows that an increase in Internet penetration decreases sales taxes, in low-tax jurisdictions by more than in high-tax jurisdictions.
Two recent papers have studied the e¤ect of online shopping on tax competition in a spatial framework following Kanbur & Keen (1993) and Nielsen (2001) . Agrawal (2017) compares the e¤ect of online shopping on tax rates for tax-free online purchases and taxed online purchases in a spatial framework with perfect competition among physical stores. He assumes that the group of online shoppers is not the same as the group of cross-border shoppers. Agrawal (2017) …nds that tax rates fall if online purchases are tax-free and tax rates increase if online purchases are subject to sales taxes. Bacache Beauvallet (2018) studies the e¤ect of online shopping on tax competition under the destination and origin principle in a spatial framework with perfect competition. She shows that online shopping reduces tax competition under the origin principle.
Bacache Beauvallet (2018) assumes that online shopping is subject to …scal leakage and that two types of consumers exist, with one type preferring to shop o-ine, while the other type has weak preferences for shopping online.
In contrast, this paper uses a spatial framework with two brick-and-mortar stores at the endpoints of the Hotelling line (as e.g., in Aiura & Ogawa (2013) ) to study the e¤ect of an online retailer on tax competition under destination principle and origin principle. Di¤erences in the consumers' location on the Hotelling line then translate to di¤erent traveling cost for purchases at the brick-and-mortar stores. Online shopping involves a …xed cost. With di¤erent traveling cost to brick-and-mortar stores, consumers have di¤erent incentives to shop online instead and pay the …xed cost instead of the traveling cost. This is, other than in Bacache Beauvallet (2018) , the fraction of online shoppers is endogenous in the model. Other than in Agrawal (2017), consumers located close to the border may be both potential cross-border shoppers and online shoppers, with online shopping as a way to trade high traveling cost for …xed cost of online shopping. This is in line with the interpretation of cross-border shopping and online shopping as substitutes (as in Ballard & Lee (2007) . Without additional or exogenous assumptions about the distribution or cost of online shoppers, this paper can explain how the tax treatment of online purchases may shape governments' incentives to compete for mobile consumers -mobile in the sense of cross border shopping and online shopping.
In this framework, the entry of the online retailer increases product market competition under both taxation principles, but weakens tax competition under the destination principle and enhances tax competition under the origin principle. Consumers in the center of the Hotelling line shop online to avoid high traveling cost for purchases at brick-and-mortar stores. Under the destination principle, buying online involves paying the same tax rate as for purchases at the local brick-and-mortar stores, shutting down strategic interaction between governments and thus tax competition. Under the origin principle, consumers located in the country not hosting the online shop choose between paying di¤erent tax rates when choosing between buying online or at the local brick-and-mortar store. This allows governments to compete for mobile consumers, with the country hosting the online shop setting a higher tax rate than the other country. Thus, under the destination principle, the online retailer eliminates competition for mobile consumers, which is similar to the closed-borders case of Kanbur & Keen (1993) . Under the origin principle, the online retailer shifts competition for mobile consumers to the country not hosting the online retailer. The smaller country in terms of tax base (which is the country not hosting the online retailer) undercuts the tax rate of the larger country, which is equivalent to the result of Kanbur & Keen (1993) and Nielsen (2001) of the smaller country undercutting the tax rate of the larger country.
For a su¢ciently low tax rate in the country hosting the online retailer, welfare in the online retailer's home country is higher under the origin principle, while welfare in the other country is higher under the destination principle. For a su¢ciently low tax di¤erential between both countries, global welfare is higher under the destination principle. A high tax di¤erential under the destination principle shifts market shares from the brick-and-mortar store in the country with the higher tax rate to the brick-and-mortar store in the country with the lower tax rate.
Also, the price-tax margin is lower for the brick-and-mortar store in the country with the higher tax rate. In addition, a high tax di¤erential decreases the pro…t of the online shop, which sets a single price but is taxed di¤erently in both countries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the model. Section 3 analyzes the e¤ect of the entry of the online retailer on tax competition and welfare. Section 4 studies the role of governments. Section 5 discusses the role of market structure, location choices, and country size asymmetries. Section 6 concludes.
The Model
Consider a Hotelling economy with two countries, j = H; F (home, foreign) on the line segment An online shop i = 0 is located in country H. Firms sell a single homogeneous product at price p i . Firms produce at constant marginal cost, which is normalized to zero.
Cross-border shopping is tax treated according to the origin principle; online shopping may be tax treated according to destination principle or origin principle.
Consumers
A unit mass of consumers is uniformly distributed on the line segment. Consumers di¤er in location y 2 [0; 1]. The utility of a consumer located at y and buying from the brick-and-mortar store i is given by
where v denotes the value of the product and d is transportation cost per unit of distance
2 d so that the market is covered. The utility of a consumer buying online is given by
where denotes …xed cost of buying online. This can be interpreted as cost of going online, delivery cost, inconvenience of waiting for the parcel service or opportunity cost of non-immediate availability of the good purchased online. Assume that < d which ensures that the online retailer has positive sales if it enters the market.
If the online retailer is not active ("o-ine equilibrium"), the consumer indi¤erent between buying at the brick-and-mortar store in country H and the brick-and-mortar store in country
2d . An asterisk denotes variables associated with the o-ine equilibrium.
If the online retailer is active ("online equilibrium"), the consumer indi¤erent between buying from the brick-and-mortar store in country H and at the online retailer is located
; and the consumer indi¤erent between buying from the brick-and-mortar store in country F and at the online retailer is located at
. The superscript DP denotes variables associated with the online equilibrium under destination principle; the superscript OP denotes variables associated with the online equilibrium under origin principle.
Firms
If the online retailer is not active, demand for both …rms is
and …rms' pro…ts are
If the online retailer is active, demand for both …rms is given as
If taxation follows the destination principle, …rms' pro…ts are given by
If taxation follows the origin principle, …rms' pro…ts are given by
Governments
In each country, there is a single revenue-maximizing government, imposing a unit tax at rate j .
If the online retailer is not active, tax revenue is
If the online retailer is active and taxation follows the destination principle, tax revenue is
If taxation follows the origin principle, tax revenue is
The structure of the model can be summarized by the following two-stage game: In the …rst stage, governments set tax rates; in the second stage …rms compete in prices. Stage two results as well as …rst stage equilibrium prices and quantities can be found in the Appendix A.1.
The E¤ect of the Online Retailer On Tax Competition

O-ine Equilibrium
Consider …rst the case without the online retailer. Consumers buy only from brick-and-mortar stores. Cross-border shopping takes place if a consumer located in country j decides to buy from the brick-and-mortar store in the other country. Figure 1a illustrates the o-ine equilibrium. The consumer located at y HF is indi¤erent between buying at the brick-and-mortar store in country H and the brick-and-mortar store in country F . The tax base in country H is equal to the sales of the brick-and-mortar store in H, the tax base in country F is equal to the sales of the brick-and-mortar store in F . In equilibrium, tax rates are
The tax di¤erential is zero ( = F H = 0). Tax revenues are
Tax rates and revenues increase in transportation cost d, as higher transportation cost makes consumers less mobile and less willing to travel to the brick-and-mortar shop in the other country, i.e., cross-border shop, weakening tax competition.
Online Equilibrium under Destination Principle
Consider now the case with the online retailer. Consider …rst that online purchases are taxed according to the destination principle. Purchases at the brick-and-mortar stores are tax treated according to the origin principle. Buying online is in particular attractive for consumers with high traveling cost, i.e., consumers with a relatively high distance to the brick-and-mortar stores at the endpoints. Consider a consumer located at some small distance left to the border in country H. This consumer does not compare the surplus from buying at the brick-and-mortar store in country H and the brickand-mortar store in country F (options with high traveling cost), as in the o-ine equilibrium.
This consumer rather trades o¤ buying at the brick-and-mortar store in country H and buying at the online shop. 5 As consumers do no longer choose between the two brick-and-mortar stores but between the local brick-and-mortar store and buying online, cross-border shopping does not take place.
With online purchases being tax treated according to the destination principle, a consumer located in country H, who chooses between buying from the local brick-and-mortar store and buying online, is taxed in country H in both cases. Deciding between the local brick-and-mortar store and buying online implies that consumers choose from which retailer to buy but not by which government to be taxed. 6 The tax base in both countries is equal to the sales of the local brick-and-mortar store plus the sales of the online store to local residents. This implies that only country size 7 de…nes the tax base. From the perspective of governments, there are no mobile consumers to compete for, and the tax base does not respond to tax changes. 8 Governments set tax rates to extract the surplus of the consumers with the smallest surplus.
These are the indi¤erent consumers located at y H0 and y 0F (and all consumers in between).
This yields the best response functions DP H = 2v For this set of equilibria, three conditions have to hold: i) Cross-border shopping does not take place. ii) All three …rms sell non-negative quantities. iii) The online retailer's pro…t is non-negative. This implies that consumers cannot choose where to be taxed, i.e., tax bases are …xed by country size, and that all three …rms are active. These conditions de…ne a maximum
. For the following, it is useful to de…ne the maximum and minimum tax rates that are compatible with the maximum tax di¤erential DP . For i)
, the maximum tax di¤erential is given as
The maximum tax rate is then
Corresponding maximum and minimum tax rev-
, the maximum tax di¤erential is given as The set of tax rates and revenues, respectively, is given as
and
The tax di¤erential may be zero, positive or negative. Then i) tax rates and tax revenues are higher than in the o-ine equilibrium, and ii) the tax di¤erential may be zero, positive or negative.
Online Equilibrium under Origin Principle
Assume now that taxation for online purchases follows the origin principle. Figure 3a illustrates the online equilibrium under the origin principle. The consumer located at y H0 is indi¤erent between buying at the brick-and-mortar store in country H and buying online, the consumer located at y 0F is indi¤erent between buying at brick-and-mortar store in country F and buying online. As under the destination principle, in both countries, consumers choose between buying from the local brick-and-mortar store and buying from the online shop. With online purchases being tax treated according to the origin principle, a consumer located in country H, who chooses between buying from the local brick-and-mortar store and buying online, is taxed in country H in both cases. However, a consumer located in country F , who chooses between buying from the local brick-and-mortar store and buying online, decides between retailers with di¤erent tax rates.
Governments compete for mobile consumers in country F who decide between buying from the brick-and-mortar store in country F and buying online.
Compared to the o-ine equilibrium, where governments compete for mobile consumers as cross-border-shoppers, this competition for mobile consumers is di¤erent in two dimensions:
First, the presence of the online retailer facilitates the choice of which tax to pay in country F . Consumers located at some distance from the border in country F do not have to travel all the way to the brick-and-mortar store in country H but can buy online instead to bene…t from the tax di¤erential. Second, as the tax base in country H is equal to the sales of the local brick-and-mortar store plus the sales of the online store, while the tax base in country F is equal to the sales of the local brick-and-mortar store only, there is an asymmetry between countries, with the government in H taxing online purchases of consumers located in F . Countries are asymmetric not in geographical size or population size but in tax base size. 
The tax di¤erential is negative ( OP = OP F OP H < 0).
Compared to the o-ine equilibrium, in the online equilibrium under the destination principle, taxes and revenues are lower (
This implies, the entry of the online retailer enhances tax competition, with the country which does not host the online retailer undercutting the tax rate of the online retailer's home country. This corresponds to the result of Kanbur & Keen (1993) and Nielsen (2001), with the di¤erence that country H is not larger in geographical or population size but has a larger tax base as online purchases are taxed in country H.
Proposition 2 summarizes the e¤ect of the entry of the online retailer on tax rates under the origin principle.
Proposition 2 Suppose that taxation for online purchases follows the origin principle. Then i) tax rates and tax revenues are lower than in the o-ine equilibrium, and ii) the tax di¤erential is negative.
Under the origin principle, tax competition is stronger than under the destination principle, which is re ‡ected in lower tax rates and revenues under the origin principle (
). As prices increase in tax rates, also prices are lower under the origin
Under the origin principle, country F undercuts the tax rate of country H. This translates to a lower price for the brick-and-mortar store in F vis-a-vis the online store and the brick-andmortar store in H, resulting in a competitive advantage for the brick-and-mortar store in F .
Compared to the destination principle with a su¢ciently high tax di¤erential DP = DP F DP H , the quantity of the brick-and-mortar store in
and the quantities of the brick-and-mortar store in H and the online shop are lower under the
. If, however, DP H >> DP F , i.e., the tax di¤erential DP = DP F DP H is su¢ciently low, then under the destination principle, the quantity sold by the brick-and-mortar store in H is much lower than the quantity sold by the brick-and-mortar store in F . A change to the origin principle (with a lower asymmetry in taxes and quantities) then increases the quantity of the brick-and-mortar store in H and decreases the quantity of the brick-and-mortar store in F .
Welfare Analysis
This subsection compares …rms' pro…ts, tax revenues, consumer surplus, and welfare between the tax treatment according to the destination principle (for given tax rates) and the tax treatment of the online shop according to the origin principle. Welfare in country H is given as
For all three stores, the extent of tax di¤erential DP = DP F DP H under the destination principle determines which taxation principle yields higher pro…ts: For the brick-and-mortar store in country H, pro…ts are higher under the destination principle if the tax di¤erential
For the brick-and-mortar store in country F pro…ts are higher under the origin principle if the tax di¤erential DP is su¢ciently high
For the brick-and-mortar store in country H, the price-tax margin and the quantity sold increase in the tax di¤erential; for the brick-and-mortar store in country F , the price-tax margin and the quantity sold decrease in the tax di¤erential. A high tax di¤erential under the destination principle shifts market shares from the brick-and-mortar store in the country with the higher tax rate to the brick-and-mortar store in the country with the lower tax rate. Also, the price-tax margin is lower for the brick-and-mortar store in the country with the higher tax rate.
For the online retailer, pro…ts are higher under the destination principle if the tax di¤erential
). Under the destination principle, the online shop sets a single price p 0 while its sales are taxed with di¤erent rates in both countries. In both countries, the online shop competes (with the same price p 0 ) against the local brick-and-mortar stores whose sales are only taxed in the respective countries.
Consider the change from an equilibrium with symmetric tax rates DP H = DP F to an asymmetric equilibrium with DP F >> DP H . This is equivalent to an increase in the tax di¤erential DP = DP F DP H . A decrease in the tax rate DP H and increase in the tax rate DP F increases the price-tax-margin of the brick-and-mortar store in country H and decreases the price-taxmargin of the brick-and-mortar store in country F . For the online shop, the price-tax-margin for sales in country H increases, the price-tax-margin for sales in country F decreases. In country H, the change in tax rates shifts market shares from the online retailer to the brick-and-mortar store; in country F , the change in tax rates shifts market shares from the brick-and-mortar store to the online retailer. This implies that for the online shop, sales in the country with the high margin (country H) decrease and sales in the country with the low margin (country F ) increase. The pro…t of the brick-and-mortar store in country H increases, the pro…t brick-and-mortar store in country F and the pro…t of the online shop decrease.
For both governments, tax revenues are higher under the destination principle (R OP
Under the destination principle, governments do not compete for mobile consumers, as cross-border shopping does not take place and thus consumers are not exposed to di¤erent tax rates. This allows governments to extract the surplus of the consumers with the lowest surplus, i.e., the indi¤erent consumers located at y H0 and y 0F (and all consumers in between).
In both countries, consumer surplus is higher under the origin principle (CS OP H > CS DP H ,
, as tax competition for mobile consumers prevents excessively high tax rates (and prices) under the origin principle. For a su¢ciently low DP H (or equivalently, a su¢ciently high DP F ), welfare in country H is higher under the origin principle, and welfare in country F is higher under the destination
). Global welfare is higher under the destination principle if the tax di¤erential DP is su¢ciently low (W OP < W DP if DP < \ DP W ). With tax revenue being higher under the destination principle and consumer surplus being higher under the origin principle, the impact of tax di¤erentials on …rms' pro…ts under the destination principle determines the welfare e¤ect of tax treatments substantially.
Proposition 3 summarizes the welfare e¤ect of the two taxation principles.
Proposition 3 For a su¢ciently low tax rate in country H, welfare in country H is higher under the origin principle, while welfare in country F is higher under the destination principle.
For a su¢ciently low tax di¤erential between both countries, global welfare is higher under the destination principle.
The Role of Governments
This section discusses alternative roles of governments. So far, this paper has assumed noncooperative revenue-maximizing governments. Governments could also be thought of cooperating and/or maximizing welfare. The superscript C denotes variables associated with equilibria with cooperation among governments; the superscript W denotes variables associated with equilibria with welfare-maximizing governments.
Cooperative Leviathan Governments
Consider the case of governments cooperating in setting tax rates and maximizing joint revenue.
O-ine Equilibrium
In the o-ine equilibrium, joint tax revenue is given as
. Joint tax revenue increases in tax rate j as long as j = j . In order to increase joint tax revenue, governments do not compete for mobile consumers and set tax rates to extract the full surplus of the indi¤erent consumer located y H0 and y 0F . Cooperatively set tax rates are given as
Tax rates and revenues are higher than under no cooperation (
Online Equilibrium under Destination Principle
In the online equilibrium under the destination principle, joint tax revenue is given as R DP;C = This case is equivalent to the one discussed in 3.2. The set of equilibrium tax rates and revenues is given as
Compared to the o-ine equilibrium with cooperation, (minimum) tax rates and revenues are higher (
Online Equilibrium under Origin Principle
In the online equilibrium under the origin principle, joint tax revenue is given as R OP;C =
. Joint tax revenue increases in tax rate j as long as j = j . Similar to the o-ine equilibrium, governments do not compete for mobile consumers and set tax rates to extract the full surplus of the indi¤erent consumer located y H0 and y 0F .
Equilibrium tax rates are
Tax revenues are
Compared to the online equilibrium under the origin principle with no cooperation, tax rates are higher ( Proposition 4 Suppose that governments cooperate and maximize joint tax revenue. Under both the destination and origin principle, the online retailer weakens tax competition.
Benevolent Governments
Consider now the case of non-cooperative governments setting tax rates to maximize welfare, given as the sum of consumer surplus, …rms' pro…ts, and tax revenue.
O-ine Equilibrium
Welfare in countries H and F , respectively, is given as 
A unilateral increase in
;W H would increase the price of the brick-and-mortar store in H and, by strategic response, to a lesser extent also the price of the brick-and-mortar store in F . This induces some consumers located in H to buy at the brick-and-mortar store in country F . The increase in prices decreases consumer surplus; the decrease in the price-tax-margin and decrease in quantity decreases the local brick-and-mortar store's pro…t. However, the increase in 
Compared to the o-ine equilibrium under Leviathan governments, tax rates and revenues are lower (
Online Equilibrium under Destination Principle
Welfare in countries H and F , respectively, is has the same e¤ect on tax revenue in country F , consumer surplus, and the local brick-and-mortar store's pro…t. The welfare-maximizing tax rate is the tax rate that balances these three e¤ects, the increase in tax revenue and the decrease in consumer surplus and the brick-and-mortar store's pro…t.
In country H, the negative e¤ect on consumer surplus and local brick-and-mortar store's pro…t increases in the tax di¤erential DP;W = to increase the pro…t of its brick-and-mortar store. However, as the online shop's pro…t decreases in the tax di¤erential (see 3.4) the incentive is lower for country H if is su¢ciently low. Thus, in equilibrium, country H sets a higher tax rate than country F if is su¢ciently low.
Compared to the online equilibrium under the destination principle and Leviathan governments, tax rates and revenues are lower (for < Compared to the o-ine equilibrium under benevolent governments, the tax rate and revenue in H is higher for su¢ciently low and the same for su¢ciently high (if < Under benevolent and non-cooperative governments, the e¤ect of the online retailer on taxes is country-speci…c: Under both the destination principle and the origin principle, the online retailer may increase the tax rate in country H for su¢ciently low and has no e¤ect on the tax rate in country F . Under both the destination and origin principle, the presence of the online retailer limits the incentive for country H to undercut the tax rate of country F .
Proposition 5 summarizes the e¤ect of benevolent non-cooperative governments.
Proposition 5 Suppose that governments maximize welfare non-cooperatively. Then under both the destination principle and the origin principle, the presence of the online retailer may increase the tax rate in country H for su¢ciently low and has no e¤ect on the tax rate in country F , creating a negative tax di¤erential for su¢ciently low .
Cooperative Benevolent Governments
Consider now the case of cooperative benevolent governments setting tax rates to maximize global welfare.
O-ine Equilibrium
Global welfare is W ;W;C = W 
Taxes are welfare-neutral, as long as tax rates in the two countries are the same. Taxes shift rents from consumers and producers to governments. A tax di¤erential induces cross-border shopping and therefore ine¢ciently high traveling cost which reduce global welfare. Therefore, cooperative benevolent governments set identical tax rates.
Online Equilibrium under Destination Principle
Global welfare is W DP;W;C = W .
Global welfare decreases in the tax di¤erential so that governments set the same tax.
The set of equilibrium tax rates is de…ned by 
Similar to the o-ine equilibrium, tax rate di¤erences induce online shopping and therefore ine¢ciently high cost which decreases global welfare. Therefore both governments cooperatively set identical tax rates. 
Online Equilibrium under Origin Principle
The set of equilibria under the origin principle depends on the competitiveness of the online retailer as re ‡ected in the …xed cost of online shopping . If is su¢ciently low ( < Under cooperative benevolent governments, the presence of the online retailer may limit the incentive of country H to undercut the tax rate of country F under the origin principle.
Under cooperative benevolent governments, equilibrium tax rates are only restricted by the condition of equal tax rates (or su¢ciently similar taxes) in H and in F under both tax treatments. Therefore, the e¤ect of tax treatment on tax competition cannot be identi…ed.
Discussion
This section addresses assumptions of the model and their implications for the analysis.
Market Structure
So far, the model has assumed that the brick-and-mortar stores are local monopolies and that all three retailers have pricing power. Assuming perfect competition among …rms would result in marginal cost pricing and e¤ective consumer prices equal to the (respective) tax rate.
For the model, however, a crucial assumption is that the cost of buying at the brick-andmortar stores is location-dependent, i.e., other than in the Kanbur & Keen (1993)-framework, consumers do not "live above a store". Then the choice between buying at a brick-and-mortar store and buying online involves trading o¤ location-dependent traveling cost and …xed cost of buying online. If there was perfect competition among a continuum of brick-and-mortar stores along the Hotelling line, consumers would not buy online for positive …xed cost of shopping online. If there were no …xed cost of buying online, consumers would buy at the retailer with the lowest price, giving rise to equilibria where all consumers buy online or consumers split between both as they are indi¤erent. 9 Consider a scenario with perfect competition among brick-and-mortar stores located at the endpoints of the Hotelling line and perfect competition among several online shops, where retailers set prices equal to marginal cost. Under destination-based taxation, this would imply that the online retailer charges an average price of the two tax rates or sets country-speci…c (and tax rate-speci…c) prices.
In the o-ine equilibrium, assuming perfect competition among brick-and-mortar stores yields tax rates
which are lower than under market power.
In the online equilibrium under the destination principle, equilibrium tax rates are
which are lower than maximum tax rates under market power and higher than minimum tax rates under market power.
In the online equilibrium under the origin principle, equilibrium tax rates are
which are lower than tax rates under market power.
The scenario of perfect competition among brick-and-mortar stores and online shops while keeping the location of brick-and-mortar stores at the endpoints of the Hotelling line yields qualitatively similar results: Under the destination principle, the entry of the online retailer mitigates tax competition and results in higher tax rates in the online equilibrium ( DP;P C H > ;P C H ; DP;P C F
> ;P C F
). Under the origin principle, the entry of the online retailer enhances tax competition and results in lower tax rates in the online equilibrium (
OP;P C F < ;P C F ).
Location
As discussed above, a crucial assumption of the model is that buying at brick-and-mortar stores involves location-dependent cost.
Brick-and-mortar stores, however, do not have to be located at the endpoints of the Hotelling line but could be located closer to the center. In the Hotelling economy, both stores have an incentive to move to the center to lower competitive pressure. For the brick-and-mortar store in country H, a location at x H > 0 would create a segment of captive consumers between 0 and x H , weakening competition among …rms.
If physical stores are located su¢ciently far away from the center of the Hotelling line, i.e., the border, cross-border shopping would not take place, and the e¤ect of the online retailer on tax competition would be similar. If physical stores are located su¢ciently close to the border, online shopping would be attractive for consumers with high traveling cost, which are now the consumer located near the endpoints. Cross-border shopping would take place. Then governments would compete for mobile consumers under both taxation principles. Under the destination principle, governments would compete for cross-border shoppers; under the origin principle, governments would compete for cross-border shoppers plus the consumers deciding between buying at the brick-and-mortar store in country F and buying online.
The e¤ect of the online retailer on tax competition is independent of its location: Under the destination principle, the taxation of online sales is independent of the online shop's location.
Under the origin principle, the online retailer could choose where to be taxed by locating in one country or the other. Therefore, tax competition arises. However, for symmetric countries, the equilibrium is also symmetric with one country hosting the online retailer. If countries would strategically compete for the location of the online retailer, this could a¤ect the results, but normally countries do not compete for the location of …rms by sales taxes.
Country Size Asymmetries
So far, the model has assumed symmetric countries. For the o-ine equilibrium, country size is irrelevant as the tax bases of both countries only depend on the location of the indi¤erent consumer y HF . Similarly, in the online equilibrium under the origin principle, tax bases of both countries only depend on the location of the indi¤erent consumer y 0F . For the online equilibrium under the destination principle, however, an asymmetry in country size could give rise to cross-border shopping, e.g., if country F is relatively small and consumers from country H which are located close to the border prefer to buy at the brick-and-mortar store in country F rather than buy online. In this case, the online equilibrium under the destination principle would be similar to the online equilibrium under the origin principle, with all online purchases being taxed by country H and countries competing for mobile consumers.
Conclusion
This paper has studied the e¤ect of an online retailer on spatial tax competition with mobile consumers. 4 . Consumer surplus in countries H and F , respectively, is 
Online Equilibrium under Destination Principle
In the second stage, …rms maximize DP H = p DP
, and
, q DP For this set of equilibria, three conditions have to hold: i) Cross-border shopping does not take place. ii) All three …rms sell non-negative quantities. iii) The online retailer's pro…t is nonnegative. This implies that consumers cannot choose where to be taxed, i.e. tax bases are …xed by country size, and that all three …rms are active.
Condition i) and ii) imply that y H0 2 [0; ; 1], indi¤erent consumer y H0 is located in country H and indi¤erent consumer y 0F is located in country F . All three stores sell a non-negative quantity and in both countries, all consumers buy either at the local brick-andmortar store or at the online retailer. This de…nes a maximum tax di¤erential: For y H0 2 [0;
0. The online shop sets a single price p 0 while part of his sales are taxed in country H and part of his sales are taxed in country F . At the same time, he competes with the same price p 0 against the brick-and-mortar store in H whose sales are taxed only in country H and against the brick-and-mortar store in F whose sales are taxed only in country F . A high tax di¤erence would result in a positive margin in one country and a negative margin in the other, with more sales occurring in the country with the higher tax, which is the country with the negative margin. The online shop would therefore run losses.
Conditions i) -iii) de…ne a maximum tax di¤erential
. For low cost of online shopping < b , the maximum tax di¤erential is DP; < b = 2 3 (d + 2 ); for high cost of online shopping > b , the maximum tax di¤erential is
The set of equilibria in the online equilibrium under the destination principle are de…ned by
Assuming the maximum tax di¤erential yields the maximum and minimum tax rates DP ; DP .
, the maximum tax di¤erential is given as 
Minimum tax rates and revenues are higher than tax rates and revenues in the o-ine equilibrium
, the maximum tax rate is DP; < b j = v, the minimum tax rate is . Minimum tax rates and revenues are higher than tax rates and revenues in the o-ine equilibrium
Firm's pro…ts are given as DP
. Consumer surplus in countries H and F is given as CS DP
. Welfare in countries H and F , respectively, is
.
Example: Symmetric Equilibrium
In the symmetric equilibrium, tax rates are Consumer surplus in countries H and F , respectively, is 
Online Equilibrium under Origin Principle
In the second stage, …rms maximize OP
, and OP
In the …rst stage, governments H and F maximize tax revenues and
. Global welfare is < 0).
Compared to the online equilibrium under the destination principle, in the online equilibrium under the origin principle, prices are lower
. For a su¢ciently high tax di¤erential DP = DP F DP H , the quantity of the brick-and-mortar store in H is lower and the quantity of the brick-and-mortar store in F is higher
), the quantity of the online shop is lower (q OP 
Welfare Analysis
For the brick-and-mortar store in country H, pro…ts are higher under the destination principle if the tax di¤erential DP = DP F DP H is su¢ciently high
, with \ DP > 0; 
Online Equilibrium under Origin Principle
In the online equilibrium under the origin principle, joint revenue of both governments is
. The joint revenue increases in both tax rates but decreases in the tax di¤erential. The joint revenue increases in tax rate j as long as j = j . > 0). Tax revenue for country H is higher, tax revenue for country F is lower (R
Governments
OP;C H R ;C H = 12v(d )+17d 2 16d +8 2 36d > 0, R OP;C F R ;C F = 12v(d ) 25d 2 +8d +8 2 36d < 0).
Benevolent Governments O-ine Equilibrium
In the second stage, pro…ts are given as 
Online Equilibrium under Destination Principle
In the second stage, pro…ts are given as < 0,
< 0;
for < < 0,
Compared to the o-ine equilibrium under benevolent governments, the tax rate and revenue in H is higher for su¢ciently low or the same for su¢ciently high (if < . If > < 0).
